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Abstract
This Essay will discuss the reasons behind the trend of privatizing water systems, explain the
basic concepts involved in privatizing water systems, and assess the benefits and challenges of
privatization. The private sector has long played an active role in helping governments design,
finance, construct, operate, and maintain potable and waste water systems. The 1990s, how-
ever, were witness to a dramatic rise in the use of the private sector to supplant–and not merely
supplement–the public sector in the water area.
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The private sector has long played an active role in helping
governments design, finance, construct, operate, and maintain
potable and waste water systems. The 1990s, however, were wit-
ness to a dramatic rise in the use of the private sector to sup-
plant-and not merely supplement-the public sector in the
water area. This Essay will discuss the reasons behind this trend,
explain the basic concepts involved in privatizing water systems,
and assess the benefits and challenges of privatization.
I. WHY PR!VATIZE?
A tremendous demand has emerged in the United States
for improving water-related infrastructure, including the need to
repair, replace, and expand aging treatment systems. Estimates
for the next twenty years range from the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency's ("EPA") US$200 billion figure to the US$1
trillion figure reported in April 2000 by the U.S. Water Infra-
structure Network. Several factors have combined to create this
massive demand for improvements in our water facilities.
First, many of the water systems now operating in the
United States consist of outdated equipment nearing the end of
its functional life. Although many systems operate properly (or
at least within accepted tolerances), a significant number are
over fifty years old, having been built in connection with the
post-World War II housing and industrial boom. As a result,
equipment problems are mounting. Furthermore, because the
technology used to build these systems is so old, they are often
far less efficient to operate than the more modern systems now
available. Even repairing old systems can be problematic, as
spare parts are no longer available from defunct manufacturers.
Older systems also tend to have higher volumes of leakage and
higher delivery costs, making them more expensive to operate.
These same systems often cannot meet the increasingly stringent
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demands of new environmental regulations, nor can they be re-
trofitted, except at great expense.
Stricter compliance standards have created a need to up-
grade older systems, as well as increased public awareness of
problems with our water supplies. Factors such as these have led
to growing political concerns over water usage and water treat-
ment. Water is no longer viewed as a limitless and free resource;
it is quickly becoming a prized-and a politicized-commodity.
Thus, politicians are eager to find ways to better protect the envi-
ronment and the water supply. For example, the Wall Street Jour-
nal reported that a Canadian town recently considered raising
funds by selling water from a local reservoir through a pipeline
to a neighboring town in the United States. When the idea be-
came public knowledge, political forces in Canada stepped in to
halt the transaction until the Canadian government could deter-
mine if the U.S. pipeline would lead to unchecked depletion of
an important natural resource.
The escalating demand for water and water treatment is ad-
ding to the complexity of these challenges. As more people
move to urban areas, the more they strain existing water facili-
ties. The sprawling development simultaneously occurring
throughout many parts of the U.S. midwest-a portion of the
country that has frequently grappled with precious water sup-
plies-is compounding this problem. Ranches and farms now
find themselves competing with homes and office complexes for
ever more scarce water resources. An increasing portion of the
manufacturing sector now requires highly purified water, espe-
cially in the pharmaceutical and microchip industries. Recrea-
tional sites (such as golf courses and resort hotels) are also mak-
ing tremendous demands on water resources.
Accompanying this concern about problems on the supply
side is the realization that if proper precautions are not taken
now, the cost of treatment and delivery could spiral out of con-
trol as demand increases. The recent problems encountered by
California's energy market-attributable in part to supply-side
generation and transmission shortfalls-could spread to the
water sector if action is not taken soon.
Increasing federal regulation of the nation's water quality
also increases compliance pressure on aging municipal water sys-
tems. For example, debate has arisen in the past several months
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over the appropriate level of arsenic in potable water. The EPA
has stated that arsenic is a known carcinogen at high levels (es-
pecially for skin cancer), and at low levels contributes to bladder,
lung, liver, kidney, and colon cancers. In its final days, the Clin-
ton Administration actively promoted a regulation designed to
tighten the drinking water standard for arsenic. The rule pub-
lished by the EPA in January of 2001 lowered the allowable level
of arsenic in drinking water from fifty parts per billion to ten
parts per billion. (At one point the EPA was considering a level
as low as five parts per billion.)
Municipal water systems were among those complaining
that the new arsenic standards were too expensive to meet and
that compliance could cost some households as much as
US$2000. Indeed, U.S. Senator Pete Domenici (Republican-
New Mexico) issued a statement declaring that in New Mexico,
where arsenic levels are among the highest in the nation, the
rule could cost at least US$400 million in initial capital expendi-
tures and at least US$16 million in annual expenditures thereaf-
ter, without producing any "scientifically-documented health
benefits." The new rule would affect about ten percent of the
275,000 community water systems in the United States, accord-
ing to the U.S. American Water Works Association ("AWWA"),
which came out in favor of the new, tighter standards while urg-
ing that the rule also be accompanied by a plan to help commu-
nities meet the requirements in a cost-effective manner. The
AWWA estimated that the rule will cost about US$6 billion in
capital outlays and US$600 million annually. U.S. Senator
Domenici responded by introducing legislation (S. 223) to nul-
lify the rule; meanwhile, other legislators sought to provide fi-
nancing (through grants and government loan programs) to
help states meet such new requirements if they remain the law of
the land. Ultimately, in the face of such complaints, the Bush
Administration repealed the Clinton-era rulemaking (leaving in
place the 50 ppb standard) and remanded the issue for "further
study."
In light of these formidable challenges, privatization of the
water sector is receiving more and more attention as a viable al-
ternative. At the municipal level, privatization can offer a num-
ber of significant benefits.
It is especially attractive to municipalities seeking a "one-
stop shopping" approach to their infrastructure needs. Let's
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look at a typical fact pattern. A municipality concludes that it
must expand its potable water and/or waste water systems in or-
der to accommodate local growth, and it must upgrade or re-
trofit these systems in order to comply with new U.S. Clean
Water Act regulations. By using the privatization method, the
municipality can locate a company that will start by undertaking
a review of current system conditions (a task the municipality
itself may not be able to do properly, especially in terms of un-
derground facilities). The company then will design a new sys-
tem, build out that system, finance it, operate and maintain it,
handle all billing and collection on behalf of the municipality,
and accept responsibility for managing and paying all related
personnel. The new operator will most likely provide some as-
surances that water costs will not rise above a certain level for a
certain period of time, and it may even provide assurances that
water costs will level out or even decline. The transfer of control
over the system in question may be accompanied (as explained
below) by a sizable upfront payment by the new operator to the
municipality. At the end of a pre-agreed period, the enlarged
and updated system may even be returned to the municipality
for no cost, or a nominal sum.
The political climate also has evolved in ways facilitating the
privatization movement. The Clinton Administration, and now
the Bush Administration, have taken to heart the battle cry for
less federal regulation in deference to more state independence,
and states have become more comfortable themselves in out-
sourcing to the private sector certain activities that were once
wholly the province of municipal government. We have, in
many areas, turned away from a belief that a regulated monop-
oly is better than a competitive marketplace. Although America
often prides itself on taking the lead in service technology ex-
ports, it is Europe that has the substantial head start in the water
privatization area. In particular, France and England have made
great strides in the operation of privatized water systems, and a
number of European companies look to America as a prized
market for their skills and wares. Thus, by good coincidence,
just when the American marketplace is considering how to best
privatize, a number of companies, both domestic and foreign,
are ready to bid-and bid aggressively-for these opportunities.
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II. HOW TO PRIVATIZE?
Several methods of privatization are possible, combining
different kinds of public and private cooperation. Perhaps the
most basic form of privatization involves a government entity
contracting out operation and maintenance (and sometimes ex-
pansion work as well) to a private firm after a competitive bid-
ding process. The government entity (most often a local munici-
pality) retains ownership of the physical assets of the water sys-
tem, such as wells, reservoirs, pumping stations, treatment
facilities, pipes, and meters. The duration of the contract may
be as short as one year, or as long as twenty or thirty years. The
municipality may continue to play a role in operating the system
by handling billing and collection, or it may cede control over
these aspects of operation to the private company as well. De-
pending on how long the contract is to remain in force, the pri-
vate company may take on the expense of capital modifications
to the system, recouping its costs through water charges to users
of the system. Such operation and maintenance contracts often
provide for both monetary incentives and penalties that are tied
to performance levels. Contracts may call for the operator to sell
water directly to private consumers; in the alternative, contracts
may be structured as bulk water sales agreements, allowing the
municipality to either mark up the cost of the water that it
purchases or subsidize the cost of water to its population.
As part of these arrangements, the new operator may be re-
quired to supply its own work force. More often the operator
agrees to either work with, or directly hire, the municipality's
work force. Such a move helps to gain the support of local un-
ions, who are generally willing to help an operator cut costs by
any means other than cutting the work force or workers' bene-
fits. If the new operator requires headcount reductions to truly
maximize savings (since new technologies often require far less
staffing), then the new operator will often volunteer to retrain
excess members of the old work force for new jobs or will offer
early retirement or other incentives to reduce the work force on
a voluntary basis. Another method of reduction is to more vigi-
lantly enforce performance reviews and substance abuse policies
to weed out underperforming or bad elements from the work
force.
Municipalities may prefer to use an operation and mainte-
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nance contract ("O&M Contract") (rather than the sale con-
tracts noted below) for several reasons. First, the so-called O&M
Contract allows a municipality to explore the benefits of out-
sourcing in a manner that is relatively easy to terminate or mod-
ify if the arrangement does not produce the desired results.
Thus, these contracts can provide for a relatively short initial
term, accompanied by an automatic or semi-automatic renewal
clause if performance is satisfactory. This approach, however,
often involves a trade off, since potential operators are less will-
ing to invest substantial time and money to upgrade or refine
any system if the contract term may be too short for them to
recover a reasonable profit.
O&M Contracts may also be used in circumstances where
local laws or municipal bond indentures prohibit the outright
sale of a government asset, but not the outsourcing of its opera-
tion. Both the municipality and the operator, however, must
consider if the duration of the proposed contract, or its terms,
could be read to have effectively ceded ownership of the assets to
the operator. These contracts may also be preferred by the oper-
ator itself, if it is worried that accepting actual ownership of the
assets could expose it to undesirable liability-such as for pre-
existing environmental claims. Operators may also elect an
O&M Contract over outright ownership if they are concerned
that outright ownership will create a new expense for the system
in the form of property taxes, which are rarely imposed on assets
under municipal ownership.
An alternative method of privatization involves the actual
sale of water system assets to the new operator, often with an
obligation at the end of some predetermined period (usually
twenty to thirty years) to return ownership of the assets to the
municipality, either without charge or for an established
amount. Usually a payment by the municipality is required at
the end of the term only if the operator has invested its own
money in upgrading the system and the duration of the contract
has not allowed the operator a realistic opportunity to recoup
those investments along with a fair profit margin and/or return
on its investment. Indeed, using the operator to indirectly fi-
nance capital improvements is a good way to take advantage of
privatization. By way of example, older bond indentures often
prohibit a municipality from incurring further debt without satis-
fying certain financial tests tied to outstanding debt limits, or
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they may require new issues of debt to be subordinated to ex-
isting debt issues. These indentures, however, may not treat op-
erating contracts in the same way, and they often treat operating
expenses as a priority to debt service on bonds. By converting
the system to operation under a private O&M Contract and re-
quiring the operator to raise and expend the debt (the cost of
which the operator recoups through service fees for running the
system), the municipality indirectly obtains the benefit of the
new financing without violating its indenture.
Sales of a water system can also perform a crucial function
for the municipality by raising capital. Auctions of larger systems
serving cities can often generate hundreds of millions of dollars.
This money can support an extensive array of municipal ser-
vices-without the politically unpopular move of raising taxes.
Such money is often received "lump sum," without the munici-
pality having to amass an equivalent amount of funds over many
tax years. Not only can the municipality raise this money, but it
can do so with no added cost to the consumer, since one of the
most important benefits of system privatizations is either no in-
crease in water costs (due to achieved efficiencies) or even a re-
duction in end-user costs. Thus, a properly structured deal can
be a win-win situation for all parties involved.
It is interesting to note that most European operators prefer
to own the assets that they operate (for greater control, among
other reasons). But in several cases, American cities have bid
out their systems for privatizations under the O&M Contract
method, while still requiring very, very significant upfront "con-
cession" payments from the winning bidder. These types of
transactions are most often associated with O&M Contracts last-
ing a minimum of twenty years, a term that allows the operator
to recoup these upfront payments. If the contract is terminated
(by agreement or by default) before the end of the expected
period, the municipality is required to pay a termination fee,
which can be set at differing levels depending on the reasons for
premature termination of the contract.
Although used less often, other potential methods of priva-
tization include lease structures and the formation of a special
purpose company to receive all assets to be privatized with the
stock of the subject company (as opposed to the assets them-
selves) being sold to the new operator. Leasing structures can
often combine the benefits of an O&M Contract with those of
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the asset sale method, especially if such hybrids are used to trans-
fer tax benefits. For example, if a new system is to be built (or
an older system expanded or upgraded) with equipment that is
eligible for depreciation deductions, but the operator is not in a
position to use these deductions directly, it can arrange for own-
ership of the system by a third party that is in a position to use
these benefits. The nominal owner appoints the operator to
raise all financing for the build out (excluding any necessary eq-
uity infusions by the nominal owner required to obtain the
proper tax treatment) and to operate and maintain the system
under a "net lease." The lease rentals are sufficient to amortize
the debt incurred to build out the system, but they also reflect
the tax benefits transferred to the new owner-and in turn, the
municipality reaps the indirect benefit of what would otherwise
be unusable tax benefits through lower water costs.
The special purpose company route has been used to isolate
a system's assets from other related functions being undertaken
by a municipality and to facilitate the transfer of these assets,
often where some form of shared ownership of the new com-
pany is desired. For example, a number of overseas municipali-
ties have marshaled support for a privatization by selling a con-
trolling ownership stake in a newly privatized entity to a foreign
investor/operator, while simultaneously arranging for entities
such as national pension plans to retain a minority interest in
the company. In some cases, ownership of a minority interest
may be offered to the public, including union members affected
by the privatization. Often this minority stake is made available
on favorable economic terms, thereby helping to assure political
support for the privatization.
Using special purpose companies to own the privatized as-
sets can often facilitate the financing and transfer of the assets
themselves (especially if the system requires the transfer of mul-
tiple permits, contracts, land rights, etc.). Transferring owner-
ship of the company's shares may be a much more efficient way
to transfer the assets, because the share transfer is generally a
single transaction, as opposed to the multiple regulatory filings
needed to transfer permits and/or the multiple contracts
needed to transfer assets. The ease of the share transfer may be
important to a municipality seeking a speedy termination of the
transaction if problems develop. Likewise, in circumstances
where the assets can be pledged (and are being pledged) to a
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financier in connection with the privatization, the financier may
insist upon a stock pledge to make foreclosure a quicker process
as well. Time-saving and cost-efficient transfers can be critical to
the success of the privatization because water systems often in-
volve an array of contractual relationships and permits.
III. HOW DOES TAX EXEMPT DEBT COMPLICATE
PRVATIZATIONS?
One of the tougher issues frequently faced by parties when
privatizing municipal water systems concerns the use of tax ex-
empt financing. Typically, United States municipalities have fa-
vored the use of tax exempt debt when financing to build or
expand their water systems. Parties seeking to privatize systems
financed with outstanding tax exempt bonds must take precau-
tions to structure the transaction so as not to run afoul of the
"private activity bond" rules of the federal tax code. Briefly
stated, these rules limit the ability of private companies to enjoy
the direct-and indirect-economic benefit of facilities fi-
nanced with tax exempt debt. One of the theories behind this
limitation is that issuance of tax exempt debt is a special right
granted by the federal government to the states in their govern-
mental capacity and private companies should not be the benefi-
ciaries of this largess.
Before 1997, the U.S. Internal Revenue Code severely lim-
ited the ability of private companies to earn profits by operating
municipal facilities financed with tax exempt debt. Although
the U.S. Code would, for example, allow a private company to be
paid a fixed fee for operating a plant, the operator usually could
not earn compensation tied to the economic success of the sys-
tem. Thus, incentive payments for improved operation were dif-
ficult to structure. Furthermore, these same regulations limited
the duration of the contracts in question and required the mu-
nicipalities to retain an option to cancel the contracts after as
few as three years. As noted above, because of the high capital
costs often associated with taking over, building, or expanding a
system, operators have relied on long term contracts to recoup
their own investments. At the same time, municipalities have
wanted to shift to the operator the risk of operating losses (in
trade for the opportunity to earn operating profits).
In a welcome development during 1997, the U.S. Internal
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Revenue Service modified the private activity bond rules to allow
private entities to operate water facilities for up to twenty years
without affecting the tax exempt status of bonds previously used
to finance the facility, so long as they adhere to certain compen-
sation formulas. Although these compensation rules can still
present structuring challenges, they do allow much more flexi-
bility for local governments to hire private companies to operate
water facilities on a long term basis while financing the project
with tax exempt debt. Despite these more favorable rules, if it is
still not possible to create a compensation structure that both
meets the needs of the operator and complies with these regula-
tions, it may be possible for the municipality to use the upfront
payments mentioned above to retire the tax exempt bonds in
order to remove this impediment to the transaction (assuming
that the bonds are callable at that point).
1V. WHAT CRITICAL CHALLENGES DO
PRIVATIZATIONS POSE?
Privatizations do not come risk or challenge free. Along
with the sensitive labor issues already discussed, environmental
and health concerns can send the municipality and the operator
into lengthy negotiations over which party bears the risk for
problems related to the raw water input and the treated water
output. These discussions can become particularly sensitive if
the municipality is privatizing only a portion of its system, so that
the new operator and the municipality will continue to share ac-
cess to certain treatment facilities or pipelines.
But these points mark just the beginning. The list of other
issues to be addressed by the parties includes the following sig-
nificant items:
" the establishment of water charges, billing and collection
procedures, and termination of service procedures;
* ownership of intellectual property used in the operating
systems;
* requirements to build out systems to reach outlying areas;
" requirements to upgrade systems to comply with chang-
ing environmental regulations or to take advantage of the
best available technologies;
* responsibility for locating replacement water sources in
times of drought;
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* sales of excess watershed rights; and liability for third
party pollution problems.
Privatization can also be complicated when the new opera-
tor is not a domestic company, but is instead one of the many
overseas companies now active in this area. Although we may
feel that the United States has, in most respects, integrated itself
fully into the world economy, we still hesitate to turn over some-
thing as sensitive as water control to what is often perceived as an
"outsider."
Along these lines, post-privatization sales or development of
excess watershed can often be a complicating and emotion-
charged factor in privatizations. In circumstances where a pri-
vate operator has purchased a municipality's water-related assets,
they may include the municipality's water shed areas as well as
industrial equipment. The private operator may conclude that
certain watershed areas are surplus to its supply needs, especially
if it intends to modernize a system by using highly efficient
equipment. In order to maximize revenue, the operator may
want to either develop the watershed area or sell it off to others
for development. In fact, such sales and/or development may
be a crucial component in the operator's overall financial plan
for the privatized system and may be necessary to help repay
debt incurred to purchase the assets (or make upfront pay-
ments) associated with the privatization in question. Such sales
and/or development, however, can lead to substantial conflict
with local environmental or community groups who are reluc-
tant to see virgin land converted to other, more commercial
uses.
By way of example, the author of this Essay lives in small
Connecticut town, whose private water supplier was recently pur-
chased by an English water company. As part of its development
plans, the English company sought to sell off certain undevel-
oped watershed areas deemed excess to its needs. The affected
communities quickly rallied to form a group to fight the pro-
posed sales. They were successful, first at forcing the company
to declare a three-year moratorium on the proposed sales and
then at obtaining state assistance to purchase the land directly
for conservation (presumably at a lower price than a private sale
would have realized).
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V. HOW DO GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND POLICIES
SUPPORT PRIVATIZATION?
The privatization movement is getting a boost from several
trends at the federal and state level. As already noted, the fed-
eral tax code restrictions have been relaxed in the area of private
activity bonds. Industry representatives are now pushing for
even more incentives to use the tax code to increase privatiza-
tion activity, especially in the water area. For example, New
Jersey has explored providing tax credits and/or sales tax relief
for the purchase of equipment associated with improving water
systems. Lobbyists are also pushing to repeal or modify other
parts of the federal tax code that require states to refund to the
federal government certain federal grant money if water-related
projects constructed with such grant money are sold to the pri-
vate sector or refinanced in certain ways. Supporters of privatiza-
tion have also pushed for legislation similar to that enacted from
time to time to support the power market. Such legislation
would actively encourage the development of privatized water
systems by excluding tax exempt financing used for water sys-
tems from state volume caps, which set the amount of tax ex-
empt debt that a state can issue.
The federal government also supports improving the water
area through various funding programs. For example, during
the 1980s state revolving funds ("SRFs") were created under the
U.S. Clean Water Act to provide low-interest or no-interest loans
to communities and states to help them address their water
needs. Under these programs, the EPA provides grants to states
to capitalize state revolving funds for projects related to clean
water and drinking water. Providing some additional money
themselves, the states then use the combined funds to make
loans (or in some cases grants) to waste water and drinking water
projects. As the loans or grants are repaid, the states "revolve"
the repayments to make further loans and grants. Under the
U.S. Clean Water SRF, the EPA provided (from 1988 to 2000)
over US$17 billion in federal money to the states, and the states
in turn provided over US$30 billion in loans. Under the Drink-
ing Water SRF, the EPA provided (from 1997 to 2000) over
US$2.7 billion in federal aid; the states had some US$4 billion in
funds available to them and provided some US$2.4 billion in
loans for projects.
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For the past several years, the annual funded amount for
SRFs has been set at about US$1.35 billion, but some senators
have recently proposed increases in that funding. For example,
U.S. Senator George V. Voinovich (Republican-Ohio) intro-
duced legislation (S. 252) to raise the annual authorization of
the SRF loan program from US$1.35 billion to US$3 billion.
The bill would also authorize technical assistance (by outright
grants) for small water systems having difficulty paying for im-
provements and repairs to waste water collection systems and
treatment facilities. In calling for the increased funding, Sena-
tor Voinovich estimated that Ohio alone needs about US$4 bil-
lion to correct problems with aging sewer systems and storm sew-
ers. He noted that while the loan program was helpful, a grant
program was also needed in those cases where repaying loans
would place a significant burden on local communities.
The just-closed 106th U.S. Congress considered some nota-
ble new bills under the U.S. Estuaries and Clean Waters Act (S.
835). Of particular interest is a proposal called the Tijuana
River Valley Public-Private Partnership, which calls for a mecha-
nism to facilitate the treatment of sewage emanating from Ti-
juana, Mexico, and flowing north into San Diego, California.
The U.S. Department of State is considering entering into a
twenty year O&M Contract with a private operator to develop,
finance, build, operate, and maintain a wastewater treatment
plant in Mexico to address this problem.
Migratory pollution to water is not limited to rivers and
other ground sources. Indeed, a study issued in December 2000
by the U.S. Geological Survey came to the troubling conclusion
that as much as one-third of the nitrogen content in coastal
streams comes from rain and airborne particles emanating from
automobiles and power plants. The areas with the highest con-
centration of nitrogen from atmospheric sources were in the
U.S. Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states. Excess nitrogen in the
water leads to overgrowth of algae, bacteria, and other micro-
scopic organisms that compete with fish, plants, and other wild-
life for the oxygen needed to survive in a water-based ecology.
VI. WHAT HAPPENS NEXT-AND WHERE?
The United States is well along the path of acknowledging
that water is a national strategic commodity-just as much as gas
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or oil. Pundits have predicted that future wars will be fought not
for land or fuel, but for water. This point is driven home by a
recent article in Lebanon's The Daily Star that reports that Tur-
key's consideration of water sales to Israel has alarmed its neigh-
bors, Syria and Iraq. "The political overtones are immense," the
article observes, "underlining Turkey's expectations of using its
vast water resources as an instrument of foreign and security pol-
icy to make it a power center in the Middle East." For Syria and
Iraq, the potential sales present a "strategic threat."
Privatization offers but one way to address the critical issues
of prudent water management and development, but it may
prove to be the best way for governments, both state and federal,
to quickly modernize our infrastructure systems. The challenge
that lies ahead is how to get state and federal officials to recog-
nize this potential and to act on it-by changing both our laws
and attitudes so that privatization becomes a viable means of
dealing with troubled waters.
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